Is Happiness Found in Pleasure?
Thomas Aquinas' argument
In this article, we will analyze whether happiness consists in pleasure.
Thomas Aquinas’ Argument
Because bodily delights are more generally known, the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them (Ethic. vii. 13), although other delights excel them, and yet happiness does not consist in pleasure or delight.
Because in everything, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man, it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory.
Now the perfect good is precisely man’s happiness, and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight the very essence of happiness, but something resulting from happiness as its proper accident.
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by the senses, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by the senses, cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the physical matter, it has a certain infinity in regard to the body.
Therefore the senses, which are a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter. Whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal and contains an infinite number of singulars.
Consequently, it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by the senses, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite a trifle compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wisd. 7:9) that all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand. And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
Objection 1: Like happiness, pleasure is desired for itself
It would seem that man’s happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the ultimate goal, it is not desired for something else, but other things are desired in order to reach happiness. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased (Ethic. x. 2). Therefore, happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
Aquinas’ Response
Whether we desire good, or desire delight, it arrives at the same place which is nothing else than the natural appetite’s rest in good. Consequently, just as good is desired for good, so delight is desired for delight itself and not for anything else. But if delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, then the good is its principle and gives it its form. The reason, then, that delight would be desired is that it rests in the thing desired. Someone may delight or take pleasure in the good, but in that case, the principle is the good, not merely pleasure.
Objection 2: Like happiness, pleasure is all-consuming
Further, the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause (De Causis 1). Now the cause of the end consists in its ability to motivate. Therefore, seemingly that which motivates the most, answers to the notion of the ultimate goal. Now, this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.
Aquinas’ Response
The force of desire for bodily delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that bodily pleasures are desired by the majority of people.
Objection 3: Like happiness, everyone and everything wants pleasure
Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
Aquinas’ Response
All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ObjR 1). Consequently, it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.